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The New Consensus that has dominated macroeconomics since the 1980s
was based on a fundamentally neoclassical structure: efficient markets that on
their own converged on a natural equilibrium with a very limited role for
macroeconomic (mostly monetary) policy to smooth fluctuations. The crisis
shattered this consensus and saw the return of monetary and fiscal activism, at
least in academic debate. The profession is reconsidering the pillars of the
Consensus, from the size of the multipliers to the implementation of reform,
including the links between business cycles and trends. It is still too soon to
know what macroeconomics will look like tomorrow, but hopefully it will be
more eclectic and open.  
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1. The “New Consensus” and the Great Moderation
From the middle of the 1980s to the beginning of the crisis in 2007,
the global economy experienced a period of strong growth, low and
stable inflation, and limited macroeconomic uncertainty. The reasons
for this period of “Great Moderation” remain unclear. Some explain it
by competent management of the cycle by monetary institutions,
coupled with reforms and deregulation that made markets more effi-
cient (Bernanke, 2004).2 This positive appreciation of central bank
action explains why when the crisis started, in 2007, monetary policy
1. This article reviews and summarizes the arguments developed by Saraceno (2018a, 2018b).
2. Others point to wage moderation, which is a factor in increasing inequality (Piketty, 2013), and
which led to asset price inflation and a credit boom, both of which eventually were at the roots of the
2007 crash.Revue de l’OFCE, 157 (2018)
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only in 2009, when the economy became enmeshed in the liquidity
trap and monetary policy lost traction, that fiscal stimulus packages
were implemented by both advanced and emerging economies. The
coordinated fiscal expansion has borne fruit and has been recognized
as a determining factor for the recovery (Eichengreen and O’Rourke,
2009). But as soon as the worst of the crisis was over, fear of deficits
and debt accumulation caused a sudden reversal of fiscal policy
stances. The shift to austerity has been particularly brutal in Europe,
where the crisis in the peripheral countries has been associated with a
long history of fiscal laxity and inefficiency (Sinn, 2014), and was thus
“cured” by means of austerity coupled with structural reforms. This
was not due to hazard but rather was the result of the economic
doctrine that dominated the profession and the major institutions in
charge of coordinating economic policy. The “New Consensus” that
developed in macroeconomics from the 1980s is based on a set of
results that are independent of the individual characteristics of the
different models:
1. The reference framework is the Real Business Cycles (RBC) model
in which fluctuations are “natural”, as they determined by the
optimal reaction of agents to technological shocks. Market
imperfections can make this natural equilibrium deviate from the
Pareto equilibrium.
2. Market imperfections, especially nominal rigidities, also cause
the economy to deviate from its natural growth rate in the short-
term, i.e. to experience demand-led fluctuations.
3. The privileged instrument of economic policy is structural reform,
which, by removing rigidities, increases the natural growth rate
of the economy, bring it to converge with the Pareto optimum.
4. In the medium term, output gaps, deviations from the natural
equilibrium, tend to be absorbed by markets.
5. Discretionary macroeconomic policies are ineffective in stabi-
lizing economic activity. Following rules is preferable, because
economic policy action becomes easier to integrate into agents'
expectations (which are therefore “anchored”).
6. Short-term fluctuations in production have no influence on the
natural growth rate (there is a dichotomy between the short and
long run, which is also reflected in standard macroeconomics
textbooks).
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On the one hand, in normal times, it would crowd out private expendi-
ture. On the other hand, during Keynesian aggregate demand crises, it
would be less effective than monetary policy in fighting the downturn,
because of the inherent lags in decision-making and implementation,
together with political biases and the risk of capture of fiscal policy by
private interests. Although preferable to fiscal policy because of its
technocratic character, monetary policy was also supposed to have a
limited impact in the management of income fluctuations, which
would mostly be taken care of by market flexibility.
2. The Return of Fiscal Policy and the Debate on Multipliers
The crisis that started in 2007 represented a major disavowal of the
Consensus, not only because it was not equipped to analyze the imbal-
ances that had their origin in the financial sector, but also because the
policies put in place to counter the crisis have prolonged the recession
and imposed a disproportionate cost on the population.
Economists have begun to question the ability of markets to absorb
shocks within a reasonable time frame, which was the pillar around
which the theoretical corpus of the Consensus had been built. Interest-
ingly, much of the research reassessing the role of macroeconomic
policy and regulation is being done by the international institutions in
charge of economic policy guidance and crisis management. This reas-
sessment of the Consensus is ongoing and wide-ranging: the reciprocal
influence between income distribution and growth (Ball et al., 2013;
IMF, 2017; Kumhof et al., 2015); the role of labour market institutions
in supporting stable and inclusive growth (Jaumotte and Buitron,
2015; Loungani, 2017); and the role of capital controls and financial
regulation (Blanchard, 2016a). In this article I have chosen to focus on
the reassessment of fiscal policy.
The austerity plans implemented in Europe’s peripheral countries
were implemented based on the belief that the size of the fiscal multi-
pliers was rather low, certainly less than one, and most probably
around 0.5. This led to the belief that austerity would be mildly
contractionary in the short-term,3 but expansionary in the long run,
when the State’s withdrawal from the economy would unleash the
potential of the markets.
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the recovery globally, and in the euro zone austerity plunged the
economy into a double-dip recession. The profession began to reassess
the rejection of fiscal policy advocated by the Consensus. Blanchard
and Leigh (2013) developed a box contained in a previous edition of
the IMF’s World Economic Outlook, arguing that during a deep reces-
sion, with monetary policy at the Zero Lower Bound (ZLB), the
multipliers were closer to 2 than to 0.5. In their view this explained why
the contractionary impact of austerity had been far greater than
expected, and hence why fiscal contraction had eventually been self-
defeating.
The debate around fiscal policy’s effectiveness therefore has taken
the form of empirical research on the size of the multipliers, which is far
from being consensual. Nevertheless, the meta-analyses of Gechert
and Will (2012) and Gechert (2015) managed to extract from the
abundant literature a number of broad conclusions: first, taking the
average of the many studies they analyze, public expenditure multi-
pliers are close to 1; this value is significantly larger than the 0.5 value
that was taken as the basis of the fiscal consolidation programmes in
crisis-ridden euro zone countries. Second, consistently with the
standard Keynesian argument, the spending multipliers are larger than
the tax and transfer multipliers. Finally, the public investment multi-
pliers are even larger than the overall expenditure multipliers (Bom and
Ligthart, 2014). For investment, the short-term Keynesian effect is
actually supposed to be accompanied by a positive impact on potential
growth in the long term. This, via expectations, may crowd-in private
expenditure (including investment). It is interesting to note that, as
long as the economy is at the ZLB, the response of monetary policy to
fiscal expansion is mitigated, and the only way to lower real interest
rates is inflation. On the contrary, once time-to-build has elapsed and
capital is in place, investment has a deflationary effect via its impact on
productivity, and pushes up the real interest rate. Thus, in times of
crisis, investment projects requiring longer time-to-build are to be
preferred, because the negative effect of deflation on the real interest
rate is postponed (Le Moigne et al., 2016).
3. Some even claimed that austerity would also be expansionary in the short-term, based on a
seminal paper by Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) on “expansionary fiscal contractions”. It has been
proven that this claim is strongly linked to specific conditions and, therefore, substantially inaccurate
(see e.g. Barry and Devereux, 1995; Perotti, 2011).
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is not really surprising, as theoretically the value of the multiplier
crucially depends on a number of factors: first, the degree of openness
of the economy, which determines how much of the additional
expenditure will be oriented towards domestic production, thus
boosting GDP, and how much will benefit trading partners through
increased imports. Then, the distance of the economy from the natural
equilibrium, i.e. the “output gap”. Regarding the latter, the debate on
the effectiveness of macroeconomic policy often neglects that
Keynesian theory applies only when there is slack in the economy, i.e.
when market equilibrium leaves idle resources that public expenditure
can mobilize. On the other hand, if the economy is at full employment,
in Keynesian as much as in neoclassical theory, the value of the multi-
plier will be zero, and crowding out will be complete.
There have not been many attempts to estimate a time-varying
value for the multiplier, which depends on the cyclical position of the
economy. Creel et al. (2011) used a structural Keynesian model, and
found that, consistently with intuition, when the output gap is signifi-
cantly negative, the value of the multiplier is much larger than when
the economy is working at near its full employment equilibrium. More
recently, using a different model (an “a-theoretical” VAR model),
Glocker et al. (2017) confirmed that even for the United Kingdom the
multiplier is higher in periods of crisis; but they also found that the Zero
Lower Bound does not have a significant impact on the effectiveness of
fiscal policy (which according to Keynesian theory should instead be
greater when monetary policy does not work as it should). Estimating a
similar model for Germany, Berg (2015) found that the cyclical posi-
tion of the economy has a marginal impact on the size of the multiplier,
which nevertheless changes over time and tends to be larger when
agents are pessimistic, or when governments can easily finance their
expenditures (so that debt sustainability is not in doubt). Contradicting
most of the previous literature, a very recent work Ramey and Zubairy
(2018) based on US data found that the multiplier is generally less than
unity even in periods of recession; only when the economy is at the
Zero Lower Bound can it, in some cases, be much higher.
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The rejection by the Consensus of fiscal policy had naturally led
economists and policy makers to argue in favour of reducing the public
debt. Excessive indebtedness would result in crowding out private
expenditure, rising interest rates and inefficiency in the economy. It is
therefore not surprising that the increase in public debt following the
2008 crisis was and still is seen as the major problem faced by the
global economy once the recovery was underway. The race to austerity
and fiscal consolidation was based on the belief that over-indebtedness
hurts growth. Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) quantified a “danger
threshold”, a red line not to be exceeded, at 90% of GDP, in a
frequently quoted article that subsequently was proved to be flawed by
calculation errors. But its main message, the existence of a universal
threshold beyond which debt weighs on growth, has not disappeared
from the public debate. Only recently, in its Fiscal Monitor (2016a), the
IMF has provided a more nuanced view. The report shifts the attention
from public to private debt, arguing that the deleveraging of house-
holds and businesses, which will continue in the coming years, will
require accompanying measures by the public sector. On the one
hand, renewed attention to the financial sector is needed to ensure
that the liquidity problems of firms (and of financial institutions) do not
degenerate into solvency problems. On the other hand, increased
activism is needed to address the macroeconomic consequences of
private sector deleveraging, including the likely savings glut, through
Keynesian aggregate demand support, implying that public debt could
momentarily grow to support economic activity.
The need to accept temporary increases in public debt in order to
ensure the long-term viability of the economy goes beyond the
management of deleveraging and the crisis. In a chapter of its 2014
World Economic Outlook, the IMF (2014) focused on public investment,
noting that there is room for increasing the stock of public capital both
in advanced and developing countries. The IMF argues that with high
public capital productivity (due to its historically low levels), and
borrowing rates that will remain close to zero, public investment has
never been so profitable, even if one were to neglect its social purpose.
An increase in public investment, even if deficit financed, would
support short-term economic activity, increase productivity and long-
term potential growth and ultimately reduce government debt-to-
GDP ratios. Public investment, argued the IMF, should be the main
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secular stagnation.
4. Structural Reforms: When and How?
The defining feature of the New Consensus is the argument that
the only way to permanently increase the potential growth rate of the
economy is to reduce rigidities, especially on the labour market. This is
why structural reforms are a pillar of the Consensus policy prescrip-
tions. From the IMF's rescue programmes in Latin America and Africa,
or the European Commission recommendation for European Mone-
tary Union (EMU) countries in crisis, to privatizations, increased
flexibility in the goods and labour market, and reducing the social
protection that hampers market efficiency, these one-size-fits-all
recommendations were considered essential to make markets more
efficient and to avoid sluggish growth. The first doubts about the
almost exclusive focus on reforms date back to the late 1990s, when
the recommendations of the Washington Consensus failed to deliver
the expected results. Criticism, however, remained circumscribed at
first, as it especially highlighted the pernicious redistributive effects of
structural reforms; furthermore, with some notable exceptions, the
critiques came from unorthodox economists.
Things changed with the crisis. While most economists still believe
that the long-run effect of reforms on potential growth is positive, their
impact in the short-term and their effectiveness depends on the condi-
tions in which they are implemented. For example, Rodrik (2013)
argued that by definition reforms are successful if they trigger a process
of “creative destruction”: efficient and innovative sectors are supposed
to absorb the resources released by inefficient sectors. But this only
happens if they can anticipate a demand for their additional produc-
tion. In times of recession, or slow and stagnant growth, capital
withdrawn from inefficient sectors and the unemployment this process
generates will not be absorbed by more dynamic activities. If imple-
mented in the wrong conditions, reforms can be counterproductive
and eventually lead to stagnation in productivity and growth.
Eggertsson et al. (2014) emphasized the importance of timing to
ensure the success of reforms. In the long term, the expected effect of
the reforms is to diminish market power, to obtain lower prices and
improve consumer welfare. In times of recession, this expected defla-
tion increases the real interest rate and further depresses private
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expansionary monetary policy to compensate for falling prices. But if
the economy is stuck at the ZLB, monetary policy has no effect and
reforms end up hurting the economy.
Recent empirical research shows that these mechanisms have been
at work. The IMF (2016b), while arguing that reforms have long-term
positive effects, warned of a number of undesirable consequences in
the short term. Labor market reforms in particular could have a nega-
tive impact on growth and productivity, if implemented during periods
of slow growth. Departing from the New Consensus, the report
concludes that reforms are not “miracle solutions”, and that they
should be carefully designed and accompanied by other measures to
support growth. Macroeconomic policies can maximize the chances of
reforms’ success both directly, through their effect on aggregate
demand, and indirectly, by changing incentives. The report goes
further, stating that “traditional” reforms advocated by the Consensus
(primarily increased labour market flexibility) should be accompanied
by more inclusive measures, for example in the areas of education and
innovation, which could help to cushion the short-term negative
impact of increased flexibility. The OECD (2016) reaches similar
conclusions. In periods of low aggregate demand, prioritizing reforms
is the key to their success. The OECD joins the IMF's analysis of labour
market reforms, which are more likely to yield short-term costs that, if
not carefully dealt with, lead to their ultimate failure. In times of crisis
the reform package must also include measures to facilitate access to
credit and investment, to reduce barriers to entry into the services
sector, as well as pension and health care reforms. The OECD goes so
far as to suggest the implementation of active employment policies
and increased investment in public infrastructure as “reforms” broadly
defined, which would of course require increased public spending.
Finally, the OECD report argues that countries with limited fiscal space
should prefer high-yield, or low-cost measures, and thus accept the
idea that sequencing is a critical element for successful reforms.
 On a similar note, commenting on the tax incentive package
announced by the Japanese government in the summer of 2016, Adam
Posen (2016) argued that fiscal policy can be a powerful tool for struc-
tural reform. He noted that tax policy was twisted to boost labour
market participation (especially for women, through investment in
childcare systems and tax cuts); these measures aim to boost potential
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policies and long-term growth.
In summary, reforms cannot be implemented with no regard for
cyclical conditions and the interaction with other policies; it is essential
to establish priorities (for example, focusing on product market reforms
rather than labour market reforms), sequencing them and putting in
place supportive macroeconomic policies. Finally, the short- and long-
term effects of the reforms cannot be dissociated from each other,
which is particularly important because another pillar of the New
Consensus has been shaken by the crisis: the idea that governments
could implement policies aimed at long-term growth without worrying
about the short-term consequences. In Europe in particular, the reces-
sion was considered as a short-term side effect that would in no way
affect the long-term gains associated with reforms and austerity. This
interpretation was based on the presumed separation between cycle
and trend, with demand factors affecting only the former and supply-
side policies the latter. This is another certainty that was shattered by
the Consensus.
5. Rethinking Macroeconomic Policy in Secular Stagnation
The severity of the recession cast doubt on the fact that it was just a
cyclical slowdown, however severe. Economists then wondered
whether the economy would one day be able to return to its old levels
of activity. On the one hand, the debate over secular stagnation high-
lighted the reasons why the growth experienced between the 1950s
and 1970s would no longer be achieved; on the other, some authors
emphasized how prolonged crises could depress physical and human
capital, causing irreversible damage to the economy.
In a widely cited paper, Delong and Summers (2012) took up an old
intuition of Blanchard and Summers (1986), which highlighted the role
of hysteresis linked to long-term unemployment: workers who remain
unemployed for prolonged periods of time lose their human capital,
and when (and if) they finally start working again, they will be less
productive. Severe fiscal austerity can therefore be pernicious in the
long term as well as the shortterm. Fàtas and Summers (2015)
provided empirical evidence for this argument, showing that short-
term shocks to the economy tend to impact potential GDP as much as
they impact current GDP. Among these shocks, they focus specifically
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particularly high, have a very negative effect on income, in both the
short and long term. Fàtas and Summers thus join the literature that
argues against fiscal consolidation and even add their two cents:
austerity at the wrong time not only causes unjustified suffering in the
short term, it can also be doomed to failure in the long run. Greece is
not an exceptional case.
The depth, intensity and duration of the crisis led to new thinking
about the possibility of recovering the growth rates of the second half
of the twentieth century. In 2014, Larry Summers resurrected a term
dating back to the 1930s, secular stagnation, to describe the dilemma
faced by advanced economies. Hansen (1939) observed that popula-
tion and capital tend to have similar growth rates over long periods of
time. Having observed a decline in the population growth rate, he
concluded that capital accumulation would slow too, inducing
depressed growth after the economic turbulence of the 1930s. History
has proven that Hansen was wrong, mainly because throughout the
second half of the twentieth century, technological innovation gener-
ated high investment and increasing capital-labour ratios.
The current discussion around secular stagnation comes in a
context that is similar to the one in which Hansen had written: an
economy struggling to regain its dynamism after a devastating crisis
triggered by a fall in demand.4 Gordon (2012, 2016) looked for an
explanation in supply-side factors, though differing from those
mentioned by Hansen. Gordon argued (not without being criticized,
see e.g. Phelps, 2013) that the technological revolution has had an
increasingly weak potential impact, and that right now a flickering
innovation faces six headwinds that keep potential growth subdued:
(1) the reversal of the demographic dividend, which weighs on the
public finances, because of aging; (2) the increase in inequality, which
reduces the accumulation of human capital; (3) the combined effect of
globalization and new technologies that has led to increased competi-
tion in the labour markets and thus to lower wages and productivity;
(4) the rising cost of global warming; (5) the burden of debt (public
and private) left by the crisis; and finally, (6) more specific to the United
States, the deterioration of the educational level. These headwinds
4. See Le Garrec and Touzé (in this issue) for a discussion of the secular stagnation issue.
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potential growth.
Larry Summers (2014, 2016) focused on the demand side of the
economy to explain the tendency towards secular stagnation: lower
technical progress, slow demographic growth and high debt together
tend to reduce the levels of investment. At the same time, the burden
of debt, the accumulation of international reserves (public and private)
induced by financial instability, and rising inequality (see also Fitoussi
and Saraceno, 2011) would increase the level of savings. The natural
interest rate decreased to close to zero, if not becoming downright
negative, which tends to generate a structural excess of savings over
investment. Summers argues that most factors exerting downward
pressure on the natural interest rate are not cyclical, but structural, so
that the current excess savings is bound to persist in the medium and
long term. The natural interest rate could remain negative even
beyond the current economic slowdown. This conclusion is not
particularly reassuring, as politicians will have to navigate, in the next
few years, between Scylla – accepting a constant excess of savings and
slow growth (unable to dent unemployment) – and Charybdis – trying
to fight the secular stagnation fueling bubbles that remove excess
savings at the cost of increased instability and the risk of violent finan-
cial crises like the one we experienced in 2007. The recent crisis is an
excellent textbook case in this respect, if we consider that the two most
important central banks in the world were criticized for diametrically
opposite reasons: the Fed accused of keeping interest rates low, thus
contributing to a housing bubble (Rajan, 2010), and the ECB guilty
according to some of having done too little and too late during the
euro zone crisis (Saraceno, 2016).
Olivier Blanchard (2016b) pushed the lines further. Moving away
from the Consensus that he helped to shape (Blanchard, 2009), he
argues that the exclusive focus on monetary policy as a stabilization
tool needs to be reassessed. With (a) low interest rates that make the
issue of public debt sustainability irrelevant, (b) the deregulation of
financial markets, which is likely to lead to greater variability in GDP
and economic activity, and (c) monetary policy that in the future might
often be constrained by the ZLB, fiscal policy should find a prominent
role among the instruments of macroeconomic regulation.
Nevertheless, Blanchard stops one step before the conclusion that
should be obvious: if the economy is doomed to remain tangled in a
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unable to reabsorb the imbalance, there are only two ways to avoid
that the ex ante excess savings depress the economy: either by a semi-
permanent negative external surplus (that is to say, a surplus of the
current account balance), or by semi-permanent public negative
savings. The first option, the export-led growth model that Germany is
today successfully generalizing at the EMU level, is not sustainable for
the global economy. Not everyone can be a net exporter: export-led
growth and non-cooperative strategies can be a solution for one
country (or region), and in the short term only. The second option, a
semi-permanent public deficit, needs to be further explored, particu-
larly with regard to its implications for EMU macroeconomic
governance. If it is true that deficit financing is not a problem as long as
the excess of private savings persists, the actual way of channeling
savings into public debt without creating instability needs to be
explored. A first option could consist of issuing “debt for investment”
reserved to residents to avoid or limit speculative capital flows (Koo,
2011; Fazi and Iodice, 2016). A more radical option would be debt
financing through “perpetual bonds” (Flaherty et al., 2016; Sachs,
2014), particularly suitable for financing long-term projects such as
those linked to the energy transition; this would de facto constitute a
debt monetization. Flaherthy et al. (2016) noted that the acceptance of
these securities as collateral by the central banks would make them
desirable even if the market return on investment was lower than the
social return.
What “new” macroeconomics will emerge from the turmoil that we
are witnessing today? Nobody knows. During the twentieth century,
neoclassical and Keynesian schools took turns in being the dominant
paradigm, each emerging from a crisis of the other. Each time the
dominant school of thought tended to become more and more closed
to external influences. The refusal to accept complexity has been the
hallmark of every dominant paradigm, ultimately driving it, a victim of
hubris, to its downfall.
Ideology certainly played a role in the transformation of the
academic debate into a parochial quarrel. The identification of neoclas-
sical economies with conservative political positions, and of
Keynesianism with progressives, has further removed economists from
accounting for the complexity of our economies. Over the last three
decades in particular, when macroeconomics came to be seen as the
result of the gradual accumulation of knowledge within the framework
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the validity of the theory depending on the historical context and insti-
tutions, nor the introduction of alternative approaches based on
different assumptions, has found any space in the academic and polit-
ical debate.
 In the past, each crisis opened a possible path of contamination,
because the dominant paradigm was weakened, while the alternatives
had not yet confirmed their hold. The New Consensus is an example of
contamination that, nonetheless, turned already starting from the
1980s into a fundamentally neoclassical mechanism. From the current
crisis, we should emerge with the methodological principle that no
theory is suitable for all seasons. Pragmatism should be the guiding
principle of macroeconomics in the coming years. We should abandon
attempts to reach a unified theory. There is no one-size-fits-all
approach or “superior” policies; economists should stop selling this
dangerous illusion to politicians.
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